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Summary
The German energy sector has close ties with 
the Columbian mining sector: large amounts of 
coal from Columbia are imported into Germany, 
particularly from the country’s export-relevant coal 
mining regions in Cesar and La Guajira. A small 
number of coal mines in these two regions extract 
virtually all of Columbia’s coal exports, including 
those destined for the German energy sector.
What responsibility do German actors bear for the 
human rights impacts and risks associated with 
Columbian coal mining: The attendant environ-
mental problems, for instance, or the influences 
on regional development, the resettlements or 
the impacts and risks associated with working 
conditions? 
This analysis, which is based on literature 
research and numerous interviews in the regions, 
attempts to answer this question. It reveals that 
responsibilities and opportunities to take action 
arise for both the businesses and the States at 
the start and the end of the supply chain. As the 
constellation of actors involved is complex, it is 
not always obvious who bears precisely what sort 
of responsibility for what. moreover, this complex 
constellation is itself embedded in a transna-
tional economic structure. This allows gaps in 
human rights protection to open. In addition, the 
responsibility for the human rights situation is the 
subject of great disagreement at the national level 
among the Colombian actors. The politicisation 
and lack of objectivity characterising the prevail-
ing discourse of the various actors contributes to 
the perpetuation of the gaps in protection; new 
strategies are called for in order to close these 
gaps. Overall, this analysis advocates a collec-
tive – transnational – effort by businesses and 
the States at both ends of the supply chain. Both, 
businesses and States, should use the influence 
they have and fulfil their responsibilities. To 
reduce human rights risks, affected local com-
munities and civil society organisations should 
also be involved. The potential of National Human 
Rights Institutions to facilitate empowerment and 
participation should be harnessed to this end. 
After first analysing the human rights situation in 
the context of the coal mining industry in Cesar 
and La Guajira, this publication looks at what 
new strategies to close protection gaps might 
involve. 
Enterprises operating in the coal regions could 
ensure that they meet their responsibility to 
respect human rights by integrating indepen-
dent human rights expertise into their corporate 
 processes, for instance, and by carrying out 
human rights risks analyses, that assess risks for 
rights holders even if there are none for the busi-
ness. They could then take measures to address 
these rights and impacts, adhering as they do 
so to the avoid – reduce – mitigate – remediate 
hierarchy.
Enterprises at the other end of the supply chain 
could engage in dialogue with their suppliers, as 
some have already begun to do, and to promote 
an integration of corporate cultures that is based 
on a common understanding of human rights 
through joint projects in the affected regions. 
They could use this as a basis on which to develop 
common, integrated processes for the implemen-
tation of human rights due diligence – for human 
rights risks and impact assessments, for example, 
and for effective responses and transparency, 
communication and grievance mechanisms. It 
is important that companies address the human 
rights risks and impacts that arise from their own 
business practises. They should not conflate this 
with abstract CSR activities not directly related 
to their responsibility to respect human rights, 
such as general social engagement to improve the 
living conditions of local residents – though it may 
not always be possible to draw a clear distinction 
between these. 
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Host states of enterprises could choose long-
term approaches in their regional develop-
ment planning and begin preparing for the 
time  following the closure of the mines well in 
advance and in a transparent manner. The home 
States of importing companies could influence 
the framework conditions for business activ-
ities through inter-ministerial processes and 
through their own national strategies to secure 
the  supply of raw materials and promote foreign 
trade. 
To ensure horizontal policy coherence, energy, 
environmental and trade policies should always 
take human rights impacts in the mining regions 
into account. 
Transnational cooperation at the regional level 
would enable National Human Rights Institutions 
to translate corporate due diligence into more con-
crete terms and set up a human rights monitoring 
system, with appropriate indicators, to monitor 
business activities and to communicate informa-
tion along the supply chain. In addition, NHRIs 
could help to set up structures supporting effec-
tive dialogue between enterprises and local com-
munities. Civil society organisations, for their part, 
have access to valuable specialist knowledge both 
because they are locally active and due to their 
international affiliations. They can act as indepen-
dent experts to help enterprises accurately assess 
the impacts of their activities, and they can also 
inform and mobilise the public.
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1 Introduction
The German energy industry uses imported 
Colombian coal to meet about a quarter of Germa-
ny’s coal demand, making Colombia the country’s 
second largest source of coal supplies, after 
Russia. Thus the supply chains of German (and 
European) energy companies are closely linked 
to the Colombian mining industry. Enterprises 
and State bodies at both ends of the supply chain 
therefore bear some responsibility for the adverse 
impacts of coal production on human rights in 
the mining regions, particularly in the Colombian 
regions of Cesar and La Guajira. These impacts 
are associated primarily with the environment, 
resettlement activities and migration, the armed 
conflict between the Colombian State and illegal 
armed groups, working conditions at the mining 
operations and at their suppliers and with regional 
economic development. 
After providing a brief introduction to the Colom-
bian mining sector (Section 2) and an overview 
of both its actual and potential adverse effects 
on human rights, this analysis highlights oppor-
tunities for transnational cooperation among 
human rights actors in the coal sector aimed 
at reducing human rights risks and strengthen-
ing remedy mechanisms (Chapter 4). Since the 
causes of adverse impacts on human rights in the 
coal mining areas in Colombia are transnational, 
it makes sense to develop transnational strate-
gies to address and, if possible, prevent these 
impacts. The aim of this study is to identify the 
responsibilities and duties of individual actors 
with respect to addressing the human rights risks 
and impacts in the coal mining sector and to 
generate suggestions as to how National Human 
Rights Institutions, States and businesses can 
better fulfil their responsibilities and obligations 
(Section 5).
The analysis is based on an assessment of the 
relevant literature,1 collaboration with Colom-
bian researchers undertaken in order to gain an 
understanding of local research perspectives,2 and 
on conversations with experts,3 and workshops 
and focus group discussions held in Colombia with 
stakeholders, including groups of affected per-
sons.4 The aim of the focus group discussions was 
to bring together actors of relevance for transna-
tional cooperation, including defensoría del Pueblo 
(defensoría), Colombia’s National Human Rights 
Institution, as well as to facilitate the collection of 
qualitative data.
The analysis is confined to the segment of the coal 
sector in Colombia that is relevant for exports. 
This segment seemed well suited as a context in 
which to consider cooperation among actors in 
home and host countries of enterprises, because 
the German energy sector obtains large amounts 
of coal from Colombia. This publication uses the 
terms “home country”/“home state” not only in 
relation to enterprises with subsidiaries (or shares 
in foreign owned enterprises) in a host country 
1 Cf. German Institute for Human Rights (forthcoming): Fallbeispiele zu menschenrechtsproblemen im kolumbianischen Bergbau. 
2 The German Institute for Human Rights commissioned a local research institute, Centro Regional de Empresas y Emprendimientos 
Responsables (CREER), and Carlos Acosta, a lawyer specialising in environmental and human rights law, to carry out research in Colombia 
based on a set of guiding questions. The guiding questions related to the economic (I) and normative (II) framework for the mining sector 
in Colombia and to case studies (III) on business operations that had had adverse impacts on human rights.
3 To triangulate the first results from the literature review, the authors of this analysis met in November of 2015 with several experts from 
the business arena, civil society and State authorities. 
4 In may of 2015 a total of six workshops were held in Cesar and La Guajira by the German Institute for Human Rights, defensoría (Colom-
bia’s National Human Rights Institution), civil society/NGOs and CREER. In separate discussions, they met with the communities affected, 
State authorities, a trade union and the enterprises drummond and El Cerrejón. CREER, the German Institute for Human Rights and 
defensoría kept records of the results. To ensure a frank and open discussion, no audio recording was made.
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(e. g. Colombia) but also in relation to enterprises 
which import from such a host country, even 
though these have few or no operations there. 
Economic aspects were considered to the extent 
that they appear to be relevant for human rights 
and development economics. The analysis of 
human rights and of the responsibilities deriving 
from them for the various actors is based solely on 
the international human rights treaties and other 
UN documents, in particular the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, the Guiding Principles for Business and 
Human Rights and the core labour standards of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) and 
ILO Convention 169. The UN Guiding Principles 
were a particularly helpful source when it came 
to identifying the responsibilities of the individual 
actors, as they provide a summary of the status 
quo in international law and enjoy high degree of 
legitimacy due to their unanimous acceptance in 
the Human Rights Council.
The analysis revealed that mining enterprises in 
the host country, importing enterprises in the 
home countries and the States at both ends of the 
supply chain bear responsibility for the sector’s 
impacts on human rights, while all stakeholders 
have the ability to contribute towards reducing 
the risks: civil society organisations and the 
communities affected can help to depoliticise 
conflicts among actors and steer discussion back 
onto a more objective track. Being at once firmly 
anchored in the national protection of human 
rights and well integrated within global struc-
tures, National Human Rights Institutions have 
the potential to bring actors together on an equal 
footing and to translate human rights obligations, 
particularly those of their States, into more spe-
cific terms by providing information and applying 
their human rights expertise.
10  mINING IN COLOmBIA
2 Mining in Colombia
2.1 The sector
The export-relevant extractive sector in Colom-
bia concentrates on four types of raw materials: 
petroleum, coal, gold and ferronickel.5 The sector’s 
share in Colombia’s gross domestic product (GdP) 
nearly doubled between 2000 and 2012, leading 
many observers to speak of a mining boom there.6 
Between 2004 and 2015, the country’s petro-
leum exports nearly tripled (from 17 to 50 mil-
lion tonnes per year).7 There is only one nickel 
extraction operation in Colombia, Cerro matoso 
but produced a fairly constant annual output of 
100,000 to 125,000 metric tonnes of ferronickel 
over these years (2004–2015).8 The gold sector is 
more difficult to characterise in terms of a trend. A 
major share of the gold mining in Colombia takes 
place in small scale mining operations.9 Such 
operations react flexibly to exogenous variables, 
such as the price of gold and prices of other 
products that they can trade in. For example, there 
is reason to believe that the trade in gold and the 
drug trade are directly linked: when gold prices 
fall, drug cultivation increases.10 In 2006, gold 
exports began to increase dramatically, rising from 
approx. 17,000 kilograms that year to 76,000 kilo-
gram in 2012. While exports did slide back down 
to 48,000 kilograms (2014) after gold prices fell 
on the global market, they have remained at a 
relatively high level nonetheless. Thus, although 
the gold sector is of lesser significance for Colom-
bia’s total export volume than the coal sector is, it 
still accounts for between 3.5 and 4.5 percent of 
the country’s current account revenue.11 
Coal’s share in total exports also increased 
significantly in the same period. In 2009, coal 
exports made up approximately 17 percent of all 
Colombian exports, twice the share relative to the 
1990s.12 By 2013, the figure had fallen to below 
12 percent, but the trend has been upward since 
then.13 Although neither coal nor metals make as 
great a contribution to Columbian GdP as petro-
leum, coal and gold mining do account for the bulk 
of production in certain individual regions.14 On 
the whole, coal, accounting for a 13 percent of 
exports, can be described as extremely important 
for the Colombia’s trade balance.15 Projections 
up to 2035 assume that coal’s economic role will 
decrease as coal deposits are exhausted and that 
the coal-mining regions will have to find other 
branches of economic activity. From a human 
rights perspective, this scenario requires pres-
ent-day consequences for the actions of States 
and enterprises (see Section 4.2).
most Columbian coal mining takes place in the 
departments (Colombian provinces) of Cesar and 
La Guajira. In 2014, income from coal exports 
5 defensoría has published a comprehensive study on nickel abstraction at the Cerro matoso mine. See defensoría del Pueblo (2014).
6 Cf. El Espectador (2014).
7 See Acosta (2016), p. 2.
8 Cf. El Espectador (2015).
9 Cf. massé / munevar (2016).
10 Cf. massé / munevar (2016), discussing substitution effects between the gold and drug sectors, which says that the routes used to 
sumuggle drugs and gold from the country are identical in some cases – which makes the substitution effect between the gold and drug 
sector possible.
11 See Acosta (2016), p. 3. 
12 Ibid. Acosta (2016).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Net exports refer to a national economy’s exports less its imports.
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accounted for nearly 50 and 40 percent of GdP 
in Cesar and La Guajira, respectively.16 La Guajira 
is home to Latin America’s largest open-pit coal 
mine, Cerrejón.17 Indigenous Colombians make up 
approximately half of La Guajira’s population.18 La 
Guajira is also one of the country’s poorest depart-
ments, according to the national statistics agency, 
dANE (departamento Administrativo Nacional 
de Estadística).19 The multidimensional Poverty 
Index confirms this as well,20 showing deprivation 
of nearly 97 % in the areas of education, health 
and standard of living for rural areas (anything 
over 50 % is considered genuine poverty). Approx-
imately 200,000 people in Cesar and 70,000 in 
La Guajira have been displaced since 1997. The 
majority of the displacements were associated 
with armed conflict.21
Indigenous and Afro-Colombian persons comprise 
a very large share – as large as 50 percent – of 
the population of the regions that have formal, i. e. 
licensed, coal mining operations. Three percent22 
of the workers in large scale mining operations are 
of indigenous or Afro-Colombian descent;23 women 
make up three percent of the workforce. At small- 
and medium-scale mining operations, around 
5 % of the workers are of indigenous or Afro-Co-
lombian descent and around 10 % are women.24 
Human rights concerns dictate that particular 
attention should be paid to the rights and needs 
of, as well as the challenges faced by, individuals 
from groups or sections of the population who 
are particularly at risk of becoming vulnerable or 
marginalised. In particular, it is necessary to pay 
due consideration to the differing risks that may 
be faced by women and men, and also children 
and adolescents.25 In the case of the large-scale 
open-pit coal mine, the need to take into account 
the differences among the risks faced by different 
groups applies in particular for the surrounding 
communities.
2.2 The enterprises
most of the mining in Cesar and La Guajira that 
produces coal for export takes place in licensed, 
large-scale open-pit mining operations extracting 
bituminous coal. drummond, Glencore/Prodeco, 
murray Energy and Caribbean Resources run such 
operations in Cesar. La Guajira is the site of the 
Cerrejón coal mining complex. All of the mines 
that extract coal for export are operated by foreign 
enterprises, or rather, the Colombian subsidiaries 
thereof.
The German energy industry has close ties with 
the Colombian coal sector. Apart from Germa-
ny’s “Big Four” energy suppliers, i. e. RWE, Vat-
tenfall deutschland, E.ON and EnBW (Energie 
Baden-Württemberg), there are other German 
enterprises involved, such as Essen-based 
STEAG, which is Germany’s fifth largest elec-
tricity producer. According to SImCO (Sistema 
de Información minero Colombiana), the mining 
information system maintained by the Colombian 
State, more than half of all coal exported from 
Columbia in 2013 went to Germany.26
Germany’s Federal Statistical Office data show 
that lignite and bituminous coal supplied 42 % 
of Germany’s energy needs in 2014. In 2013, 
7,884,000 tonnes of Colombian coal were imported 
to Germany for use in coal-fired power plants. Thus, 
Colombia is Germany’s second most important coal 
16 See Acosta (2016), p. 2. 
17 See CREER (2016), p. 36.
18 See dANE (2010), p. 2. 
19 See CREER (2016), p. 7. 
20 The multidimensional Poverty Index is an indicator developed by the UNdP that measures poverty using five individual indicators including 
health, employment and standard of living. For detailed information see United Nations development Programme, (undated): multidimen-
sional dimensional Poverty Index (mPI). http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi (retrieved on 02.06.2017).
21 See Hamm / Schax (2014), p. 22.
22 See CREER (2016), p. 19.
23 Cf. Balch (2013).
24 See CREER (2016), p. 11.
25 The specific set of problems is not examined separately hereinafter however.
26 See PAX (2014), p. 75. 
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supplier (after Russia), supplying approximately one 
fourth of the total demand in this country.27
Summarizing, one can say that export-relevant coal 
mining in Columbia is carried out chiefly, though 
not exclusively, in the departments of Cesar and 
La Guajira in mining operations run by enterprises 
from the USA, Canada, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and South Africa. German enterprises 
figure in this context primarily as coal importers.
Enterprises active in the Colombian mining sector
Enterprise Description
drummond 
(Cesar)
drummond is a US mine operator with one mine in Alabama, USA, and two in 
Colombia (mina Pribbenow and El descanso). drummond also operates its own 
port in Colombia, Puerto drummond.28 The enterprise also has operations at 
two other ports in the US (in Alabama and Virginia).
Prodeco (Cesar / 
La Guajira)
The Colombian enterprise Prodeco is a wholly owned subsidiary of one of the 
world’s largest commodity corporations, Glencore plc, which has its headquar-
ters in Switzerland. Glencore’s Colombian holdings include two coal mines 
in Cesar and about one-third of the Cerrejón mine, which it holds through 
Prodeco.29
murray Energy 
Corporation 
(Cesar)
By its own report, murray Energy Corporation is the largest coal mining com-
pany in the USA, where it has most of its operations. murray Energy bought 
Goldman Sachs’ coal mines in Colombia in 2015.30
Caribbean 
Resources Corpo-
ration (Cesar)
Caribbean Resources Corporation, formerly Pacific Coal, is a Canadian min-
ing company engaged in the acquisition, exploration and production of coal in 
Colombia.31 The company owns two mines in Cesar and one in Boyacá.32
Cerrejón (La 
Guajira)
Cerrejón is the largest open-pit coal mine in Latin America and the tenth largest 
in the world.33 BHP Billiton, Anglo American and Glencore each own a one-third 
share of Cerrejón.34 BHP Billiton mines metallic and energy minerals and has 
its headquarters in Australia and the UK. Anglo American mines and processes 
metals, coal and diamonds. Headquartered in London, Anglo American is listed 
on the stock exchange both there and in South Africa.35 In 2016 it announced 
its intention to sell its shares in Cerrejón amid reports that BHP Billiton and 
Glencore might take over its stake.36
27 See Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (2014), p. 27.
28 Cf. drummond LTd. Colombia (n.d.).
29 Cf. Prodeco (2016). 
30 Cf. The Wall Street Journal (2015).
31 Cf. Finance Colombia (2016). 
32 Cf. Caribbean Resources (n.d.). 
33 Cf. mining-technology.com (2013).
34 See CREER (2016), p. 36.
35 Cf. Cerrejón (n.d.): Our Company. 
36 Cf. Bloomberg (2016).
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3 Human rights and development in the 
 Colombian coal mining sector
In publicly available English-language publica-
tions that appeared between 2010 and 2017, 
28 case reports describing adverse impacts on 
human rights from coal mining in Colombia were 
found. According to these publications, business 
activities are adversely affecting the enjoyment 
of numerous rights: the rights to life, liberty and 
security, rights to freedom of assembly and free-
dom of association, the right to an adequate stan-
dard of living, consultation rights of indigenous 
peoples, the right to own property, the right to 
freedom of movement, the right to compensation, 
right to health and rights at work.37 
The purpose of this analysis is to identify oppor-
tunities for international actors to cooperate 
to reduce human rights risks in the Colombian 
mining sector and to address their impacts. 
This being the case, it seemed methodologically 
appropriate to place the analysis itself within 
the context of this kind of cooperation. To this 
end, the German Institute for Human Rights, 
Germany’s National Human Rights Institution, 
joined with defensoría del Pueblo, Colombia’s 
National Human Rights Institution, on field visits 
to the export relevant coal regions of Colombia.38 
Accompanying the delegations from the two 
human rights institutions was a representative 
from CREER (Centro Regional de Empresas y 
Emprendimientos Responsables), a research insti-
tute that conducted an extensive human rights 
impact assessment in Colombia’s mining sector 
and enjoys the trust of the various stakeholders 
for that reason. This approach allowed the inquiry 
to encompass a complex network of relation-
ships: the German Institute for Human Rights is 
engaged in an exchange with the coal importers 
from Germany and with the Germany’s Federal 
Government, and specifically with the Federal 
ministry for Economic Cooperation and develop-
ment. defensoría, for its part, is able to initiate 
contact with the mining enterprises on the ground 
through its offices in the regions. In addition, 
defensoría receives complaints from local com-
munities and thus has ties with affected groups in 
the regions.39
The delegation, made up of staff from the National 
Human Rights Institutions of Germany and Colom-
bia and CREER, arranged to hold separate focus 
group discussions in La Guajira and Cesar with 
individual stakeholder groups: local communities 
in Cesar40 and La Guajira41, civil society organisa-
tions in Cesar42, and the mining enterprises drum-
mond, in Cesar43, and Cerrejón, in La Guajira44, as 
well as with Columbian authorities in both regions, 
specifically, ANLA (Autoridad Nacional de Licen-
cias Ambientales), the national environmental 
37 Cf. German Institute for Human Rights (forthcoming): Fallbeispiele zu menschenrechtsproblemen im kolumbianischen Bergbau. 
38 The German Institute for Human Rights set up this cooperation on the basis of its cooperation model for transnational cooperation in the 
area of business and human rights [cf. GIHR (2014): Transnational cooperation in business and human rights. A model for analysing and 
managing NHRI networkshttp://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/fileadmin/_migrated/tx_commerce/Transnational_Cooperation_
in_Business_and_Human_Rights._A_model_for_analysing_and_managing_NHRI_networks.pdf (retrieved on 13 mar. 2017)]. 
39 Cf. German Institute for Human Rights (2017): Good Practice NmRI Kooperation: die Zusammenarbeit des deutschen Instituts für men-
schenrechte mit der defensoría del Pueblo.
40 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with communities in Cesar
41 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with communities in La Guajira.
42 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with civil society in Cesar.
43 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with civil society in Cesar.
44 Cf. minutes of the meeting with Cerrejón in La Guajira.
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authority, and Corpocesar and Corpoguarjira,45 the 
regional environmental authorities.46
3.1 Human rights impacts 
and risks
Local communities described the environmental 
impacts of coal mining and the threat of resettle-
ments as their greatest concerns. In this context, 
clear lines of conflict became apparent between 
the communities and enterprises and the com-
munities and the State authorities. This involved 
not only conflicting interests, but also diverging 
perceptions of impacts and contradictory assess-
ments of the causes of problems. It became clear 
that the local communities harbour a high level of 
mistrust vis-à-vis the enterprises and State author-
ities, and vice versa.
Environment: It can be stated at the outset, 
irrespective of the stakeholders’ reports, that 
coal mining in general does have impacts on the 
environment and thus can be associated with 
consequences for human rights.47Changes to the 
environment, such as deterioration of air qual-
ity and lowering of the level of the groundwater 
table, have adverse impacts on human rights, 
particularly the realisation of the right to an 
adequate standard of living and the right to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health (Articles 11, 12 of ICESCR).48 The severity 
of the human rights abuse is determined not only 
by the nature of the cause, but also by the local 
conditions: in drought regions like La Guajira, 
for instance, lowering of the water table or the 
diversion of rivers can considerably exacerbate 
problems with access to drinking water.49 Negative 
impacts of this kind are not limited to communities 
living in the areas directly influenced by the mines: 
even areas quite distant from the mines can 
experience decreases in water availability. Adverse 
health effects – ranging from respiratory diseases 
to cancers – reported by communities living in 
the area directly influenced by the mines are by 
their nature multifactorial and thus can seldom 
be traced exclusively to one specific activity of an 
enterprise.50 
In the eyes of the members of the local communi-
ties in La Guajira and Cesar that took part in the 
discussions, the mining companies are directly 
responsible for the higher rates of health prob-
lems among local people. One participant also 
accused the enterprises of being responsible for 
the lack of health care, claiming that doctors in 
the mining region would refuse to treat members 
of these communities due to influence exerted by 
the enterprises. Other participants supported this 
statement. The enterprises rejected the accu-
sation. moreover, the enterprises failed to see 
any connection between their water use and the 
water shortage in the regions. The debate on the 
environmental impacts of coal mining is highly 
politicised and characterised by a lack of trust 
at both ends of the supply chain and among all 
stakeholders.51
The companies are the best informed about the 
environmental impacts of coal mining, since they 
know what their output volumes are and are famil-
iar with the technology in use. moreover, by their 
own report, they also regularly take measurements 
of the air quality. The coal-importing enterprises 
(in the home countries) are far from the operations 
and have no direct access to the relevant data of 
their suppliers. However, the importing compa-
nies are in close contact with their suppliers and 
have the potential to influence them at least to 
some degree (see Section 4). The considerable 
45 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with State authorities in Cesar.
46 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with State authorities in La Guajira.
47 Cf. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (n.d.).
48 Cf. max Planck (2016).
49 Cf. Contraloría (2014).
50 Cf. Contraloría (2014).
51 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with communities in Cesar, minutes of the focus group meeting with State authorities in Cesar, 
minutes of the focus group meeting with State authorities in La Guajira, minutes of the focus group meeting with civil society in Cesar, 
minutes of the meeting with drummond in Cesar and minutes of the meeting with Cerrejón in La Guajira.
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geographical distance between the importing 
companies and the mining operations results in a 
responsibility gap on the side of the home-country 
enterprises.
Resettlements: In the case of large-scale open-pit 
mining operations of the kind carried out in Cesar 
and La Guajira, it is a common occurrence for res-
idents of the areas near a mine to have to resettle. 
This is associated with the opening of a new pit 
upon the exhaustion of the coal deposit in another 
pit. The representatives of the local communities 
in Cesar and La Guajira spoke of negative experi-
ences with resettlement during the discussions in 
La Guajira and Cesar. One representative from La 
Guajira reported experiencing violence during the 
resettlement, when he refused to leave his house. 
He also reported the seizure of belongings that 
had still not been returned.52 The communities in 
La Guajira had already undergone resettlement, 
but were dissatisfied with the housing and living 
conditions in their new location. They complained 
about polluted drinking water, about having insuf-
ficient cultivable land for their farming and about 
the poor state of the road that passes through 
their village. They also reported that many fami-
lies had to make do without electricity, because 
the insufficient acreage available for pasture and 
cultivation meant that they were unable to earn 
enough money to pay their power bills.53 One of 
the local communities in Cesar was facing the 
prospect of resettlement in the near future. The 
representatives of this community complained 
that the discussions about the resettlement had 
resulted in social divisions within their community. 
All of the communities in question are Afro-Co-
lombian communities, which enjoy special consul-
tation rights – like those of indigenous groups.54 
Representatives of two La Guajira communities 
and one community in Cesar complained that their 
communities’ African origins were not recognised 
despite their self-identification as Afro-Colombian. 
This had resulted, they said, in their being denied 
the right to prior consultation, even though the 
mining activities had a massive impact on the area 
they lived in.55 As the communities see it, negoti-
ations concerning the conditions of resettlement 
carried out with enterprises are not conducted 
on the basis of equality, and the State is either 
absent or biased.56 When speaking of the resettle-
ments, Cerrejón and drummond paint a picture 
of a model, particularly participative process,57 
whereas persons affected and the civil society 
organisations that see themselves as their advo-
cates decry massive human rights abuses.58 All in 
all, it was clear that the positions of the actors in 
the mining regions were deeply entrenched and 
left little room for dialogue between them. Those 
involved saw the National Human Rights Institution 
as being the most likely source of any mediating 
potential. The discussions did not address the 
importers, the German enterprises or the Euro-
pean home countries.
Working conditions: The representatives of 
the local communities participating in the focus 
52 Resettlements still do not always take place without violence, which may come from private security firms or the police. In such cases the 
right to physical integrity is therefore also abused/violated [see Wright (2014) on this; cf. Arbeitsgruppe Schweiz-Kolumbien (2007)].
53 On “adequate housing” and “forced evictions” see: UN, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997): General Comment 7; 
see also German Institute for Human Rights (2014): Information anlässlich des Berichts der Sonderberichterstatterin für angemessenes 
Wohnen, Raquel Rolnik. http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/fileadmin/_migrated/tx_commerce/Information_der_Abteilung_
Int_menschenrechtspolitik_anlaesslich_des_Berichts_der_Sonderberichterstatterin_fuer_angemessenes_Wohnen_Raquel_Rolnik.pdf 
(retrieved on 06.02.2017). 
54 Under ILO Convention 169, indigenous peoples have the right to be consulted whenever their collective rights and community interests 
might be affected by measures such as exploration projects or mining activities. Having ratified ILO Convention 169 in 1991, Colombia 
has a duty to comply with it. In Colombia, indigenous people and for Afro-Colombian groups have consultation rights; the State must 
respect, protect and fulfil those rights. For an overview of the legal framework in Colombia, see ministerio del Interior (2013), p. 9.
55 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with communities in Cesar and minutes of the focus group meeting with communities in La 
Guajira.
56 moreover, consultations often do not take place until after relevant advance decisions have been taken [cf. Hermández / Salcedo / 
Arango (2015), minutes of the focus group meeting with communities in Cesar, cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with communities 
in La Guajira]. 
57 Cf. Cerrejón (n.d.) and drummond LTd. Colombia (n.d.).
58 Cf. Acevedo (2014).
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groups in Cesar and La Guajira reported that 
almost none of the members of their communi-
ties were employed in the mines. One community 
reported having a single member who worked 
in the local mine; another community said that 
none of its members had found a job with the 
mining companies. Trade union representatives 
that met with the dImR, defensoría and CREER 
in Cesar criticised the adequacy of the measures 
the companies had in place to protect workers 
against long-term health damage due to work-
place-related diseases.59The trade unions reported 
that hundreds of mine workers are suffering from 
illnesses,60 and criticised the companies for largely 
ignoring work-related diseases.61 The companies, 
they said, often had no concept for health at the 
workplace in the first place, or at any rate had 
taken no action to implement one. Enterprises 
were not complying with their obligation to recog-
nise work-related illnesses as such, they said, so 
measures to improve working conditions at the 
operations were lacking.62 According to the trade 
union representatives, the region’s coal mining 
companies had also repeatedly thwarted the right 
to strike, without eliciting any response from the 
State.63 Employees perceive the competent labour 
authorities as being complicit in the companies’ 
efforts to impede the exercise of the right to 
strike.64 The local enterprises, however, stressed 
that they complied with national and international 
requirements. According to Cerrejón, the same 
applies for its contractors and suppliers.65 
Armed conflict: Some of the publicly accessi-
ble publications reviewed, and particularly PAX 
(2014), focus on the connection between mining 
and armed conflict in Colombia.66 The publications 
primarily discuss violence perpetrated by paramil-
itary groups against the population. most cases of 
armed conflict in the export-relevant coal region 
are associated primarily with the right-wing para-
military group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia. 
Little overt mention of armed conflict was made 
during the discussions that defensoría, the dImR 
and CREER held in the region.67 Since PAX (both 
2014 and 2016) has directly accused drummond 
of being tied to the murder of trade union rep-
resentatives, the topic is a very sensitive one, 
making open discussion of it difficult. Represen-
tatives of communities and trade unions in Cesar 
reported receiving threats in the mail, but neither 
claimed to know who had written them. Although 
the peace negotiations between the Colombian 
Government and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia) dominated public debate 
while data was being collected in preparation for 
the qualitative discussions for this study, they 
appeared to be less of a focus of attention in the 
59 While accidents in the large formal coal sector are significantly less common than in the informal, subterranean sector, the former does 
involve safety risks that must be addressed with appropriate preventive measures. According to Agencia Nacional de minería data, 
between 2005 and 2016 there were at least 875 “emergencies”, 1,061 deaths and 585 persons injured in the Colombian mining sector 
as a whole. Of these, 81 percent were associated with coal mining. The formal sector accounted for 74 percent, and 94 percent of all 
incidents occurred in underground mining operations [cf. Agencia Nacional de minería (2016)].
60 The risk of long-term health damage is particularly high because many of those who work in the coal mines are exposed to severe vibra-
tion and extreme noise levels as well as physical stress and coal dust [cf. Peñuela (2013) and Robledo (2016)].
61 According to NGO data, chronic exhaustion, back pain, silicosis (miner’s phthisis), arthritis and hearing loss are widespread [cf. Butler 
(2012); also see Section 4.1]. 
62 International studies have uncovered evidence of a causal link between coal dust of the kind created in open-pit mining and lung diseases, 
vascular disorders and cancer. Colombia’s Office of the Controller General has made explicit reference to this [cf. Rico / Salamanca 
(2013)]. The trade unions currently report that hundreds of employees are suffering from diseases [cf. Peñuela (2013) and Robledo 
(2016)]. 
63 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with trade unions in Cesar, see also ITUS (2013). For example, in August of 2013, drummond 
attempted to break a strike by workers at its Colombian operations, particularly those represented by the Sintraminergética union, an act 
condemned by the trade union confederation Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia (CUT), The competent labour authorities were 
criticised as being complicit with the enterprise.
64 Cf. also ITUC (19.08.2013).
65 Cf. Cerrejón’s labour-related social responsibility policy [Cerrejón (n.d.): Política de Responsabilidad Social Laboral. http://www.cerrejon.
com/site/desarrollo-sostenible-%E2%80%A2-responsabilidad-social-rse/empleados/relaciones-laborales.aspx (retrieved on 02.06.2017)]. 
66 Cf. PAX (2016a, Goodland (2011), Amnesty International (2013), Banco de datos (2013), Colombia Reports (2015), El Spectator (2016) 
and United States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit (2016). 
67 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with civil society in Cesar, minutes of the focus group meeting with communities in Cesar and 
minutes of the focus group meeting with civil society in Cesar.
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focus groups. With reference to the gaps in protec-
tion and to ways that actors might work together 
internationally to close them, three aspects relat-
ing to the peace process are discussed below: (1) 
the peace agreement as an investment incentive; 
(2) the tension between investment protection and 
the peace process and (3) policy in Europe that 
can be associated with Colombian mining.
(1)  The peace accord as an investment incentive: 
The incentive for enterprises to invest in the 
regions grows with increasing confidence 
that the regions will remain at peace. In other 
words: investment is positively correlated 
with political stability. Securing such stability, 
however, is rendered more difficult by the fact 
that the State authorities in the region are 
already overwhelmed by the task of regulating 
the existing enterprises and securing remedies, 
in cases of adverse impacts on human rights 
in connection with resettlements, for example, 
or cases where coal production has resulted in 
damage to the health of local residents.68 
(2)  Tension between investment protection and the 
peace process: It is not clear whether invest-
ment agreements shield enterprises from the 
land restitution requirements69 arising from the 
Colombian Victims and Land Restitution Act 
(Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras)70.71 
Enacted as part of the peace process, this leg-
islation entered into force in 2011.72 Under this 
Act, some enterprises will have to return land to 
which they acquired rights during the conflict. 
This may conflict with international investment 
law, since Colombia is a signatory of 18 trade 
and investment agreements. According to van 
Ho (2016), who studies this topic, the enter-
prises remain protected if the purchase was 
concluded with the approval of the competent 
State authorities. Oral approval would suffice.73
(3)  Policy in Europe: Policy decisions in Germany 
and Europe were not a topic at the discussions 
in the coal regions. For instance, none of the 
groups interviewed assigned any significance 
to the EU Conflict minerals Regulation. yet 
political decisions made in Europe do influ-
ence the human rights situation associated 
with export-relevant coal mining in Colombia. 
The EU Conflict minerals Regulation, adopted 
on 16 march 2017, after around two years of 
debate, defines only tin, tungsten, tantalum 
and gold as conflict minerals.74 If PAX’ (2014) 
allegations that a business relationship exists 
between paramilitary groups and drummond 
should prove to be true,75 it is not clear why 
coal would not also be a “conflict mineral”.76 
Even if the accusations are not borne out, 
one must still ask how an enterprise that is 
68 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with State authorities in Cesar; minutes of the focus group meeting with State authorities in La 
Guajira. 
69 See Pax (2014), p. 73. Pax argues that enterprises had profited from forced evictions perpetrated by illegal armed groups since these evic-
tions made the land available for them to use without having to negotiate an agreement with the communities. Examples are the eviction of 
at least 33 families in machoacán (1999–2004) and a minimum of 48 families in El Prado (2002). Corroborative evidence came from Pax’s 
analysis of assassinations that took place between the years 2012 and 2016, most recently in September of 2016, in which the target was 
an Afro-Colombian activist who had been actively opposing the expansion of a drummond mine [cf. PAX (2016a) and PAX (2016b)].
70 Cf. Congress of the Republic of Colombia (2011). 
71 Cf. van Ho (2016), p. 60-85. 
72 Cf. Congress of the Republic of Colombia (2011). 
73 Cf. van Ho (2016).
74 Cf. Euractiv (2017).
75 Seeking truth in a conflict or post-conflict situation is known to be extraordinary complex and has more dimensions that court decisions. 
Cf. mariëlle matthee Brigit Toebes marcel Brus (2013) “Armed Conflict and International Law: In Search of the Human Face”, Springer 
Verlag, S. 322.
76 In a conflict the state has additional duties as described in UNGP 7 to ensure that businesses operating in a conflict area are not involved 
in abuses, including “[d]enying access to public support and services for a business enterprise that is involved with gross human rights 
abuses and refuses to cooperate in addressing the situation”. An armed conflict means also that there are additional obligations for 
the state under international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict, and under international criminal law. This implications 
of such conflict for the human rights due diligence of home-state businesses, including importers as defined in this study, have to be 
further discussed, what we cannot do in the realm of this study. However, it is clear that conflict and post-conflict need to meet stricter 
requirements.
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knowingly operating in a conflict area can com-
ply with its due diligence obligations.
at any rate, whether they involve investment 
agreements or supranational regulations or direc-
tives, the political decisions made in the enter-
prises’ home country can have an impact on the 
human rights situation in the host country. this 
aspect tends to be overlooked when policy mea-
sures, with respect to trade for instance, are con-
sidered: a responsibility gap is created between 
the home states, e. g. germany (or the eu at the 
supranational level) and the host states, in this 
case, Colombia.
Development: the topic of (subnational) regional 
development arose during the talks with the 
stakeholders in connection with two aspects: 1) 
lack of impetus from the mining sector towards 
fulfilling human rights in the mining regions and, 
specifically in connection with what happens to 
extraction royalties 2) plans for the post-mining 
period. 
(1)  the first aspect was raised by the civil society 
actors in Cesar: Coal mining, they said, has 
not lived up to the hope that it would serve as 
a “motor for development”77 helping the state 
promote human rights. the mining regions had 
not benefited because adequate resources 
either had not been generated, or had not 
been spent appropriately, for instance, to com-
bat unemployment, poverty or hunger, estab-
lish functional education or health systems or 
secure the basic social security of the popu-
lation. nor, they pointed out, had there been 
successful efforts to promote the rights of 
disadvantaged or discriminated groups, such 
as the indigenous population, in any system-
atic way. on the contrary, mining had resulted 
77 Cf. arboleda / Coronado / Cuenca (2014).
78 more than one mayor of the City of la Jagua del ibiríco has received a prison sentence in recent years for embezzlement of public funds 
(cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with communities in Cesar).
79 For instance, organisations like ask and pas have pointed to incorrect tax payments and licensing fees by glencore [cf. minutes of the 
focus group meeting with civil society in Cesar and arbeitsgruppe schweiz-Kolumbien (2007)].
80 according to the united nations development programme, la guajira is experiencing a humanitarian crisis due to the shortages of food 
and water there [cf. programa de las naciones unidas para el desarrollo en Colombia (2015)].
81 Cf. defensoría del pueblo (2008). 
82 Cf. defensoría del pueblo (2008).
83 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with state authorities in Cesar and minutes of the meeting with Cerrejón in la guajira.
in further marginalisation. research conducted 
by Creer and the Colombian environmen-
tal lawyer Carlos acosta, which the german 
institute for Human rights commissioned in 
advance of the research trips, also indicated 
that indigenous and afro-Colombian popula-
tions make up a vanishingly small proportion 
of the workforce in this sector (see section 2). 
both civil society and the local communities 
cited the susceptibility of state bodies to cor-
ruption as the greatest obstacle to a use of the 
revenues generated by the coal mining that 
would be appropriate from the perspective of 
human rights.78 on the other hand, enterprises 
exploit legal loopholes and manipulate out-
puts with the aim of minimising the taxes and 
charges they pay to the public coffers.79 back 
in 2008, defensoría pointed out in a resolution 
that mining royalties, if used appropriately, 
could do much to mitigate the human rights 
impacts of the shortage of food and water 
in la guajira.80 the same resolution criti-
cised the lack of transparency as to what the 
government does with the incomes from coal 
mining.81 For instance, reportedly, part of the 
income is ploughed back into the coal mining 
sector, because Colombia’s regional develop-
ment plans treat coal mining as a development 
motor.82 
(2)  in response to the institute’s question as to 
whether preparations were underway for the 
time after the mining enterprises pulled out, 
the state authorities referred only to envi-
ronmental aspects: to obtain a licence, an 
enterprise would have had to have submitted 
to the national environmental administration 
(anla) a mine closure plan that included 
ecological reclamation plans.83 anla does not 
ask for assessments of the social, economic 
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and human rights impact of mine closures 
 however.84 Cerrejón told the delegation from 
the institute, defensoría and Creer that its 
operations are scheduled to shut down in 
2035.85 since the mining sector’s share in 
the department’s gdp is generated almost 
entirely by Cerrejón,86 la guajira’s gdp can 
be expected to drop considerably once those 
operations shut down.87 this gives cause for 
concern that the decline in the department’s 
overall economic strength will negatively 
affect other sectors, and hence on regional 
development. For instance, not all of Cerre-
jón’s suppliers will be able to find other cus-
tomers. accordingly, the strategy pursued by 
la guajira’s regional development plan is to 
concentrate economic strength on the tourism 
sector. to supplement the information obtained 
from the discussion with the authorities, anla 
and Corpoguarjira, the institute has included 
la guajira’s regional development plan in this 
analysis: the plan envisages the promotion 
of a sustainable ecological tourism focussed 
on the indigenous population, with tourism 
profiting from this population’s work while also 
strengthening it economically. Yet the handi-
crafts typical for indigenous groups currently 
account for only a very small portion of la 
guajira’s gdp: trade (“comercio”) as a whole 
in the department generated a total of around 
7 percent of la guajira’s gdp in 2014.88 
tourism and indigenous economies will hardly 
be able to compensate for the lost income 
from the mining sector - so growth rates will 
decrease. From a human rights perspective, it 
is necessary for the state to take action that 
will enable it to fulfil its duty to fulfil human 
rights despite having fewer resources. the 
states’ duty to fulfil human rights requires that 
84 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting with state authorities in Cesar and minutes of the meeting with Cerrejón in la guajira.
85 Cf. minutes of the meeting with Cerrejón in la guajira.
86 Cf. minutes of the meeting with Cerrejón in la guajira. 
87 Costs associated with restoration and renaturalisation also have to be taken into account.
88 see gobernación de la guajira (2016), p. 339.
89 Cf. international Covenant on economic, social and Cultural rights (iCesCr), general Comment 3.
90 the initial post-growth (in the enterprises’ home-countries) and post-extractivism (in the enterprises’ host-countries) debates have not 
focussed on human rights issues. 
 the end of extraction activities and thus of economic growth in la guajira is not dependent on policy decisions or intellectual debates; the 
exhaustion of resources makes it inevitable. Human rights-related preparations for this foreseeable development are necessary in order to 
safeguard the progressive realisation of economic, social and culture rights. see ulloa (2015) on post-extractivism in latin america. 
the core of the economic, social and cultural 
human rights, i. e. the minimum essential levels 
of the rights, be realised and that states then 
use the maximum of their available resources 
to progressively achieve the full realisation 
of those rights.89 the Colombian authorities 
could not point to action of this kind, or even 
demonstrate that this human-rights dimension 
of development had been taken into consider-
ation at all. accordingly, the mine closure plans 
that mine operators are required to submit 
need not include any such consideration of 
human rights. a “post-extractivism” that builds 
on local practices - such as indigenous econo-
mies - could serve as a point of departure here, 
but it will certainly not be able to attain the 
economic value of the coal sector.90 moreover, 
thus far, the topic of post-extractivism has 
received more attention in academic discourse 
than in the practical discussions on coal mining 
in Colombia. 
3.2 Preliminary conclusions: 
The responsibility gap
mining is a highly politicised issue, making an 
objective exchange among actors virtually impos-
sible: the enterprises either deny that their opera-
tions have any negative impacts at all, or they give 
assurances that they can mitigate the impacts. 
local communities, for their part, see all human 
rights problems, especially negative impacts on 
the right to health, food and housing, as rooted in 
the actions of the enterprises. the state authorities 
invoke the expertise of the enterprises and make 
little attempt to conduct investigations of their 
own. there is a general lack of trust among the 
actors, particularly between the local communities 
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and civil society on the one side and the mining 
enterprises and the state authorities on the other.
the importing enterprises and their home states 
do not initially figure among the set of regional 
actors, although they are the principal users of 
the coal produced and their demand for coal has 
a powerful influence on the economic structure of 
the departments involved. trade and investment 
agreements between home and host states, as 
well as the former’s energy policies and strat-
egies for securing the supply of raw materials, 
shape the course of development in the mining 
regions and thus influence the realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights. this indi-
rect influence that business operations have on 
the human rights situation in the mining regions 
makes the task of mapping responsibilities more 
complex. the following section investigates the 
responsibilities that arise to the individual actors, 
focusing particularly on the importers and their 
home states, and attempts to identify strategies 
for those involved, including the national Human 
rights institutions.
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4 Networks, states and enterprises as 
 human rights actors in the mining sector 
This section examines the responsibility that 
arises for each stakeholder and looks at what 
courses of action are available to each of them. 
Among the stakeholders discussed are the 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) 
in the home and host countries, including the 
offices of the latter in Colombia’s provinces, and 
the National Human Rights Institutions in the 
neighbouring countries. The same key actors are 
discussed: the mining enterprises operating in the 
host country; the importers in the home countries 
(for these purposes primarily those in Germany), 
the communities in the mining regions; the host 
State; the home State and civil society. Beginning 
with a look at the challenges for the regional net-
work of NHRIs and for transnational cooperation 
among them, the analysis then turns to outline the 
obligations and responsibilities of Germany as the 
home State and of the German energy sector as 
home-country enterprises. The role of civil society 
all along the coal supply chain is also discussed.
4.1 Cooperation among 
National Human Rights 
Institutions in Latin America
most Latin American countries play host to foreign 
business enterprises, especially mining sector 
enterprises: operations extracting raw materials 
in these countries are largely run by or for foreign 
customers. The human rights impacts of these 
enterprises’ activities are felt primarily in the areas 
of the mines. For this reason, the National Human 
Rights Institutions in Latin America concentrate 
on the conditions in these areas, focusing in 
particular on collective, indigenous and land rights 
and on the environmental impacts.91 This is asso-
ciated to no small degree with the fact that the 
NHRIs in the region (with the exception of Chile’s) 
have a mandate to hear and consider complaints 
and devote a large share of their resources to 
those activities.92 moreover, the Latin American 
NHRIs see encouraging their national govern-
ments to fulfil their human rights commitments as 
their primary function. Transnational cooperation 
has therefore not been a major focus of many of 
these NHRIs in the past. However, a focus group 
discussion with Latin American NHRI brought to 
light several areas where cooperation among them 
might be helpful with respect to human rights 
monitoring of international supply chains in the 
mining sector and assessing the human rights 
risks arising from them.
Responsibility of enterprises: Joint formulation 
and specification of human rights due diligence 
obligations in the region. In view of the frequent 
similarities between the problems that arise in 
the different countries, it would be advisable for 
the LA NHRIs to develop the requirements for 
a human rights due diligence system for enter-
prises collectively and in consultation with one 
another. Such a system would need to differentiate 
between the corporate responsibility to protect 
human rights and the voluntary contributions of 
enterprises within the framework of social respon-
sibility (corporate social responsibility, CSR). 
Monitoring of business activities: A great many 
enterprises have operations in multiple Latin 
American countries but do not hold themselves 
91 Cf. minutes of the focus group meeting in Bogotá during the multi-stakeholder meeting with representatives from the NHRI of Bolivia, 
Peru, Paraguay, Guatemala, Ecuador, mexico and Colombia and of the La Guajira and Cesar regional offices of Colombia’s defensoría.
92 See Linos / Pegram (2015), p. 29-30. 
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to the same standards in all of those countries. 
For this reason, NHRIs in the region should keep 
one another informed about the various activities 
of enterprises in their countries. Cooperation 
could also involve NHRIs from Canada or Europe 
when enterprises headquartered in their countries 
are involved or when the relevant exports are 
being shipped there. This would be a contribution 
towards the development of a joint, transnational 
system for monitoring business activities.
Asymmetric information: While the NHRIs in 
Latin America do monitor the effects of mining in 
their countries, they often lack detailed information 
about which foreign and transnational enterprises 
are involved. The offices in the individual regions 
have even less information about this. At the same 
time, enterprises in the home country, e. g. import-
ing companies, often have only a rudimentary 
picture of the human rights impacts that the min-
ing operations may be having in the host country. 
A transnational exchange of information would 
enable all actors, and first and foremost the NHRIs, 
to improve their level of knowledge in this regard.
Dialogue between local communities and 
enterprises: establishing a dialogue between 
the local communities and the enterprises that is 
based on equality constitutes a key challenge fac-
ing NHRIs.93 This is an area where National Human 
Rights Institutions could learn from one another 
and develop methods for establishing successful 
sectoral dialogue.
Developing indicators for tracking recommen-
dation implementation: One important function 
of National Human Rights Institutions is that of 
formulating recommendations for States on the 
subject of the necessity of and ways of improving 
their fulfilment of their human rights obligations. 
In some cases, these recommendations are based 
on years of research. However, as yet there is no 
effective method for tracking the implementa-
tion of recommendations. The National Human 
Rights Institutions could work together to develop 
criteria that they could use to measure and assess 
whether the States have implemented their 
recommendations.
State’s ability to regulate: To compensate par-
tially for the curtailment by investment protections 
of the State’s ability to regulate, NHRIs could work 
together to support the States in this respect. 
There is a danger that human rights conventions 
and investment protection agreements may come 
into competition in the international law arena. 
International protections safeguard the rights of 
enterprises, whereas investment and trade agree-
ments do not take the human rights obligations 
of the host States sufficiently into account. The 
result is that the protection of investors impedes, 
to some extent, human rights-related regulation by 
the State.94 One example is the conflict between 
entitlements to land restitution under Colombia’s 
Victims and Land Restitution Act (Ley de Víctimas 
y Restitución de Tierras) and the protection of 
investor’s property (see Section 3.1). In countries 
where such tensions between investment protec-
tion and human rights exist, NHRIs could draw 
attention to courses of action by States that rep-
resent the best available means for States to fulfil 
their obligations. They could exchange experiences 
and examples of good practice. 
4.2 The role of German 
actors under the UN Guiding 
Principles
The human rights impacts of mining enterprises 
occur primarily in the mining regions (see Sec-
tion 3). yet the mining operations are linked 
to enterprises, States, unions and civil society 
organisations all over the world through complex 
supply relationships. European coal importers (see 
Section 2), for instance, are among those indi-
rectly involved in the operations and their impacts 
in the mining areas.95 Apart from the State actors 
93 See “Resettlements”, Section 3.1.
94 Cf. INEF (2014).
95 Cf. Schuller / Utlu (2014): Global supply chains make it possible for profits in one country to be linked to human rights abuses in another: 
“If a value chain is structured in a way [sic] that the human rights violation and the accumulation of wealth occur in different countries, it 
can be appropriate to ask for remedy in the country where wealth is accumulated”. 
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in Colombia already described, there are also 
State bodies in Germany involved, for instance, 
through instruments of foreign trade promotion 
or raw materials strategies: the Federal ministries 
for Economic Affairs and Energy (BmWi) and for 
Economic development and Cooperation are two 
examples. moreover, all of the ministries involved 
in interministerial processes like the develop-
ment of the National Action Plan for Business and 
Human Rights have some influence on the frame-
work conditions for business activities, including 
those in Germany’s coal-importing energy sector. 
Enterprises: The requirements for German enter-
prises arise particularly from Principle 13(b) (in 
conjunction with Principle 17(a)) of the UN Guiding 
Principles: According to this principle, business 
enterprises’ responsibility to respect human rights 
requires that they “seek to prevent or mitigate 
adverse human rights impacts that are directly 
linked to their operations, products or services by 
their business relationships, even if they have not 
contributed to those impacts.”
Principle 17 describes how enterprises are to 
carry out their due diligence: they should identify 
and report on human rights risks and impacts, 
take appropriate action and track the implemen-
tation of actions taken. What appropriate action 
entails depends on the extent of the “leverage” 
the enterprise has “in addressing the adverse 
impact” (Principle 19). This also applies to enter-
prises whose business activities are linked to the 
enterprise operating in the host country through 
the import of commodities. Home-country enter-
prises frequently complain that they do not have 
this “leverage” because both they and the enter-
prises in the host country are dependent on prices 
on the world market. When commodity prices 
(the price for bituminous coal in this case) were 
falling, enterprises’ scope for influence over their 
business partners was shrinking, the enterprises 
reported, adding that in many cases the only 
remaining option would be to end the business 
relationship, a step which might itself be associ-
ated with negative impacts on human rights. If the 
business relationship remains intact, the argument 
goes, the home country enterprise remains able to 
obtain information with the minimum of delay from 
host country enterprises (in this study, this refers 
primarily to the mining companies operating in 
Columbia) and possibly act in a mediatory capacity 
between stakeholders. When a business rela-
tionship is ended, this flow of information ceases 
with it.96 However, the enterprise STEAG, Germa-
ny’s fifth largest energy company, uses contractual 
clauses to make its suppliers commit to its policy 
commitment, withdrawing from a business rela-
tionship if the partner refuses to accept this.97 
Coal-importing enterprises like RWE, E.ON and 
Vattenfall are members of the initiative Better-
coal,98 whose aim is to improve working and envi-
ronmental conditions directly in the coal mining 
regions and through the supply chain. The asso-
ciation focuses on engagement with interested 
groups and people directly affected and has drawn 
up a code of ethical principles and provisions 
that enterprises are expected to fulfil and that is 
intended to form the basis for regular assessments 
on the ground. Bettercoal brings external human 
rights expertise, for instance CREER and SOmO, 
into its discussions, which is essential for sector 
initiative and in line with the requirements of the 
UN Guiding Principles.99 The initiative is therefore 
in principle a welcome development from a human 
rights perspective. However, taken on its own, the 
instrument is far from sufficient to fulfil the UN 
Guiding Principles’ requirements for human rights 
due diligence. The “smart mix” called for in the 
Guiding Principles refers to a combination of man-
datory regulations and voluntary measures that 
foster human rights. A sector initiative like Better-
coal has to be assessed against such a framework 
of legislative, political and business approaches 
towards integrating human rights into business 
processes. For the purposes of implementing the 
UN Guiding Principles, voluntary measures alone 
96 Cf. minutes of the meeting with EnBW in Berlin. 
97 Working meeting of Global Compact Network Germany, “mit menschenrechtlicher Sorgfalt loslegen – erste Schritte zum management der 
menschenrechtlichen Auswirkungen Ihres Unternehmens”, 13.04.2016.
98 Cf. Bettercoal (2016): members. https://bettercoal.org/members (retrieved on 28.06.2017). 
99 Cf. Bettercoal (2016).
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will not suffice. They may even have a legitimis-
ing effect without actually bringing about human 
rights improvements. The non-governmental 
organisation Urgewald, for instance, has accused 
the Bettercoal initiative of being merely a case of 
“greenwashing” – purely a PR campaign. The initia-
tive, they suggest, undermines any serious effort 
to promote transparency, as it fails to take up the 
most important cases, and Bettercoal’s board 
is made up entirely of representatives of energy 
corporations that back the notion of non-binding 
commitments.100 In its critical study “Vattenfall’s 
dark Side”, Urgewald portrays the way that the 
energy corporation has created a cheap alibi for 
itself in Bettercoal, using it to legitimise its coal 
imports from Cesar. For instance, according to 
Urgewald’s report, Vattenfall has cited a Bettercoal 
mining-operation audit that recorded no evidence 
of serious human rights impacts.101 The very fact 
the statements coming from different stakeholders 
contrast so starkly, combined with how difficult 
it is to demonstrate causality in many situations 
(described in the human rights analysis in Sec-
tion 3), is reason enough to conclude that a sector 
initiative alone will not suffice. 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI)102 can provide a positive impetus for greater 
transparency and accountability in the collection 
and disclosure of revenues generated in connec-
tion with the extraction of natural oil, gas and 
mineral resources. RWE and other German enter-
prises are among those supporting EITI’s efforts 
to get governments to disclose information about 
tax payments, licences and output and other 
important data relating to the extraction of energy 
sources and mineral resources. Germany joined 
the countries implementing the EITI standard in 
2016 and is scheduled to present its first report 
in 2017.103 Colombia has begun to implement the 
EITI standard as an EITI candidate but does not 
yet disclose sufficient information about revenues 
from the extractive sector to satisfy the standard. 
Transparency is essential to ensuring that local 
populations benefit from the extraction of coal in 
their countries. Home-country enterprises should 
support EITI and use their influence to persuade 
their business partners in the host countries to do 
the same.
In Colombia’s case, the information flow between 
host-country and home-country enterprises 
has improved in recent years. For instance, the 
German political foundation Friedrich-Ebert 
Stiftung, the IG BCE (a union representing workers 
in the mining, chemical and energy industries) 
and the power supply company EnBW organised 
a conference in September 2014 in which the 
mine operator drummond took part. According 
to EnBW, the most important takeaway from 
this conference was that companies should join 
together, as a sector, to engage in dialogue with 
local communities and civil society and work with 
them. After undertaking a joint exploratory mis-
sion in march of 2015, for instance, drummond 
and EnBW developed a project aimed at improving 
local communities’ access to water in Cesar and 
La Guajira.104 The communities receive assistance 
with their well drilling projects in the form of engi-
neering knowledge supplied by the enterprises. 
The communities involved now have access to 
water around the clock, according to EnBW. EnBW 
sees this project as going beyond a corporate 
social responsibility measure: as they see it, the 
project could be considered in terms of a “rem-
edy” since the communities involved live in the 
area affected by the mines. The energy supplier 
concedes, however, that this project did not miti-
gate all of the adverse impacts that drummond’s 
business activities have had on communities’ 
access to water.105 Here lies the crux of the differ-
ence between the human rights due diligence and 
companies’ CSR activities: the companies have 
to take responsibility for adverse impacts that 
their activities cause or contribute to (UN Guiding 
Principle 17(a)). Corporate engagement that is not 
100 Cf. Urgewald / FIAN (2013).
101 Cf. Urgewald (2016).
102 Cf. EITI (2015).
103 Cf. d-EITI (n.d.): Umsetzung der d-EITI. https://www.d-eiti.de/de/ (retrieved on 10.02.2017). 
104 Cf. EnBW (2016). 
105 Cf. minutes of the meeting with EnBW in Berlin.
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linked to an enterprise’s own business activities is 
no substitute for action to uphold an enterprises’ 
responsibility to respect human rights within 
the meaning of the UN Guiding Principles. This 
applies to the home-country enterprises as well, 
including importers. Since their business activities 
are directly linked to the operations of the host 
country enterprises, they too bear responsibility 
for the activities of the latter at their operations 
and thus have a duty to ensure that human rights 
are respected. The commentary to Principle 19 
discusses what home-country enterprises should 
do if the activities of their suppliers result in 
human rights abuses. It identifies four factors that 
a home country enterprise should consider in this 
situation: (1) its leverage over the host country 
enterprise, (2) how crucial the relationship to 
that enterprise is, (3) the severity of the human 
rights abuses in question and (4) whether ending 
the relationship might have an adverse impact on 
human rights.
From the perspective of the UN Guiding Princi-
ples, the more complex the situation is, the more 
important it is that enterprises seek “independent 
expert advice”. Principles 23 and 24 clarify how 
enterprises should proceed in a given context. 
The commentary to Principle 23 identifies actors 
who are able to provide independent expertise 
in complex contexts. These include National 
Human Rights Institutions, in addition to Govern-
ments, civil society and relevant multi-stakeholder 
initiatives.
In all cases, the enterprise in the home country 
should use its influence to reduce the human 
rights risks entailed in the business activities of 
its partner in the host country. If the enterprise’s 
leverage is limited, it should try to obtain more – 
for example, by providing training offerings or 
capacity building in the host country enterprise. 
If the home country enterprise is unable to obtain 
more leverage, the Guiding Principles, in the 
commentary to Principle 19, recommend putting 
an end to the relationship. It is essential, however, 
that potential adverse impacts of doing so should 
be taken into account, for instance, in cases where 
there is reason to believe that there would be even 
less respect for human rights were the enterprise 
not to take part in a project.
States: The State is the principal human rights-
duty bearer. In order to ensure that human rights 
are protected against abuse by third parties, 
including enterprises, States must take appro-
priate measures to prevent, investigate, punish 
or redress such abuses. The UN Guiding Princi-
ples recommend that States use the full range 
of permissible measures to prevent or remedy 
such abuse: effective policies, legislation and 
adjudication. 
States’ extraterritorial obligations have a key role 
to play in closing the responsibility gap associated 
with human rights infringements by enterprises 
in the transnational context.106 One interpreta-
tion of existing international law would have it 
that there is an extraterritorial dimension of the 
State’s duty to protect. This would mean that 
States would have to regulate activities of their 
enterprises both inside and outside of the State’s 
territory. The non-binding maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights107 certainly 
interpret the State’s duty to protect in this way.108 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights do not assume that duties of this kind exist. 
According to Principle 2, however, States should 
“set out clearly the expectation that all business 
enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their 
operations.” Recognising that international law 
does not generally prohibit States from regulating 
enterprises with activities around the world, the 
UN Guiding Principles present strong reasons for 
States to endeavour to do so. Increasingly, the UN 
treaty bodies have been recommending the adop-
tion of domestic measures with extraterritorial 
106 Cf. Kaufmann / Good / Ghielmini / Blattner (2016).
107 Cf. ETOs (2013).
108 Under Article 38 d of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the teachings of the most highly qualified international law experts 
of various nationalities can be applied as subsidiary means to determine the rules of law. Accordingly, some consider the maastricht 
Guidelines to be an authoritative source for the interpretation of international law.
26  NET WORKS,  STATES ANd ENTERPRISES AS  HUmAN RIGHTS ACTORS IN THE mINING SECTOR
effects; this approach has begun to figure promi-
nently in the General Comments and Concluding 
Observations of all such bodies.109 
If business activities in the Colombian coal mining 
sector are having adverse human rights impacts, 
one must first ask whether the Colombian State 
has fulfilled its duty to protect. In addition though, 
because of the supply chain relationship with the 
German energy sector, another question arises as 
well: whether the German State is doing enough to 
ensure that German buyers exercise their human 
rights due diligence. 
This due diligence builds the core of the respon-
sibility to respect human rights that business 
enterprises are expected to shoulder and exists 
independently of the State’s duties to protect, 
which form the first pillar of the UN Guiding 
Principles. Principle 7 describes the States’ 
obligations in relation to business enterprises in 
situations of armed conflict, which stand in addi-
tion to those placed on States in such situations 
by international humanitarian and criminal law. 
In areas affected by conflict, the host State may 
be incapable of protecting human rights due to a 
lack of effective control in the territory. Therefore, 
when transnational enterprises are involved, their 
home States can play a role by helping both the 
enterprises and the host State to protect human 
rights, in order to ensure that enterprises are not 
involved in human rights abuses (commentary to 
Principle 7).
Furthermore, the duty to protect of the State in 
the home country encompasses the responsi-
bility to ensure policy coherence (Principle 8). 
This means that States should ensure that any 
and all State bodies that have an influence on 
business practises observe the State’s human 
rights obligations. Horizontal policy coherence 
means that State bodies that are responsible for 
investment, export credits and trade also observe 
and are aware of these obligations, according to 
the commentary to Principle 8. This necessarily 
applies to national strategies for securing the sup-
ply of raw materials as well, since these strategies 
affect human rights by shaping business practic-
es.110 Policy coherence should extend to a State’s 
energy and environmental policies as well: such 
policies should always take the impacts on human 
rights in the mining regions into account and they 
should be shaped in a way that does not impede 
the progressive realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights.
Jurisdiction in the home country: When human 
rights abuses that occur in host countries are 
linked to home country enterprises through supply 
chains, the question of jurisdiction arises. might 
the courts in the home countries be responsible 
for the victims from host countries? A civil action 
against the discount clothing company KiK heard 
by the dortmund regional court is a test case in 
this respect: In march 2015, an action was filed in 
the dortmund court by one survivor and parents 
of three victims of a fire that broke out in the Ali 
Enterprises textile factory in Karachi in Septem-
ber 2012, which killed 260 people and injured an 
additional 32. In August 2016, the court accepted 
jurisdiction and granted legal aid to the Pakistani 
claimants.111
Civil society: UN Guiding Principles 18 and 23 
envisage an important role for civil society organ-
isations: that of channelling their independent 
expertise, particularly on country-specific and 
local contexts, into the human rights due dili-
gence processes of enterprises. In addition, civil 
society can provide a corrective function vis-à-vis 
the State, drawing attention to any failures by the 
State to fulfil its duty to protect.
Civil society organisations can be part of a mech-
anism that systematically tracks the status of 
human rights implementation and access to 
justice for members of local communities (human 
rights baseline). Such baseline tracking should 
109 See Kaufmann / Good / Ghielmini / Blattner (2016), p. 54. 
110 Cf. Lambert (2012).
111 Cf. European Center for Constitutional Human Rights (2016).
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include “biocultural community protocols”112, 
asking what existing resources could be adversely 
affected by enterprises.113 Civil society organisa-
tions can provide legal assistance and facilitate 
access to justice for those affected.
Their closer ties to the local communities enable 
civil society organisations to play a role on the 
ground in helping to ensure that those affected are 
better integrated into the relevant decision-making 
processes of businesses and make their voices 
heard. International civil society organisations and 
organisations in the enterprises’ home countries 
can act as a counterweight to industry representa-
tives in the media and in political processes, such 
as the drafting of the national action plan.
It must be noted though that it is possible for the 
interests of local communities and of civil society 
organisations to conflict. Enterprise representa-
tives warn that organisations might exploit the 
concerns of communities in their pursuit of their 
own aims, which are primarily political.114
112 “Biocultural community protocols are protocols that indigenous and local communities develop on their own behalf that are used in nego-
tiations between the communities and State bodies, enterprises, scientists, nature conservation organisations and other interest groups 
to regulate access to and the use of the knowledge and resources of the communities.” [Translation of the original German] http://www.
infoe.de/web/images/stories/pdf/infoe_waldstudie_final_net.pdf, p. 68-69 (last retrieved on 21.06.2017)]. 
113 Remarks by Tierra digna at the multi-stakeholder meeting on 09.03.2015 in Bogotá (cf. minutes of the focus group meeting in Bogotá 
during the multi-stakeholder meeting with representatives from the NHRI of Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Guatemala, Ecuador, mexico and 
Colombia and of the La Guajira and Cesar regional offices of Colombia’s defensoría).
114 Cf. minutes of the meeting with drummond in Cesar and minutes of the meeting with Cerrejón in La Guajira.
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5 How actors can close the responsibility gap
German (and European) enterprises have close 
ties to the Colombian coal mining sector through 
their supply chains. This means that the relevant 
enterprises and State structures on both ends of 
the supply chain are responsible for the human 
rights impacts of coal production in the mining 
areas, primarily in the Colombian departments of 
Cesar and La Guajira. 
In considering the human rights impacts of coal 
mining, one has to examine the constellation of 
the actors that are in a position to influence how 
these impacts are addressed. Obligations arise 
for the State hosting the operations, in this case, 
Colombia, including all of the government units in 
the provinces. Enterprises carrying out the mining, 
in this case usually foreign mining corporations 
with operations in Colombia, and enterprises that 
purchase the extracted coal also have obligations. 
National Human Rights Institutions also have 
an increasingly important role to play – those in 
the home and host countries as well as those 
in other Latin American countries. Two equally 
central questions that arise in this context are 
what options are available to the communities 
affected, and what function and effect does civil 
society have in the provinces, in the region and 
internationally.
Further potential lies in the notion of transnational 
cooperation between host and home country 
NHRI. For instance, the NRHIs of the importing 
States could provide information that is not avail-
able in the host countries, e. g. cataloguing the 
enterprises at various points of the supply chain 
that are involved in the business activities and 
their local impacts.
National Human Rights Institutions cannot close 
the responsibility gaps on their own however. 
There is also an important role to be played by civil 
society organisations (non-governmental organ-
isations, NGOs), which, like NHRIs, can serve as 
external experts brought in as part of business 
due diligence mechanisms. They can serve enter-
prises as an important source of independent 
expertise, assisting them to assess the impacts of 
their business activities correctly. Local NGOs in 
particular are familiar with the conditions spe-
cific to a given country and area, with the general 
political situations and with specific operating 
environments. Thanks to their close ties with local 
communities, they also have specialist knowledge 
and can ensure that the voices of those affected 
are heard. Thus international NGOs and NGOs 
in the home countries can provide an important 
counterweight to business and State perspectives 
in political processes. In order to avoid legitimacy 
deficits and ensure that they do not put their own 
political aims before the interests of rights-hold-
ers, NGOs should ensure that they have robust 
feedback loops with local communities. Transna-
tional civil society cooperation can contribute to 
political governance in the area of business and 
human rights: NGOs can cooperate to inform and 
mobilise the public at both ends of the supply 
chain. From a human rights perspective, efforts 
like these are particularly welcome when they suc-
ceed in drawing attention to the perspectives of 
local rights-holders rather than remaining limited 
to situations in which NGOs from the Global North 
advocate for the causes of people in the Global 
South.
The fact that home-country enterprises are linked, 
via coal imports, to mining operations in the host 
countries makes these enterprises responsible for 
the adverse human rights impacts of those oper-
ations. An enterprise does not have to be directly 
involved in the impacts in order for such a respon-
sibility to arise: just the link over the supply chain 
is enough. In order to close the responsibility gap, 
home-country enterprises need opportunities to 
use leverage over the supplier operating in the 
host country. Some home and host country enter-
prises have already taken steps in this direction; 
one sees evidence of this in the joint CSR projects 
in mining areas, such as the provision of technical 
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support for well drilling by drummond and EnBW. 
Initiatives like Bettercoal also contribute to raising 
standards. 
However, the human rights due diligence pro-
cesses that some home-country enterprises have 
instituted are not adequate to the task of exhaus-
tively cataloguing local problems and reacting to 
them. While the home States are not obligated 
under the UN Guiding Principles to protect human 
rights outside of their jurisdiction, the UN Guid-
ing Principles do call on them to draw on the full 
range of permissible preventative and remedial 
measures. Victims of human rights abuses in host 
countries face enormous hurdles if they wish to 
sue for remedy in an enterprise’s home country 
however.115 Lastly, and importantly, home States 
should adjust their strategies for securing the 
supply of raw materials to ensure that they do not 
result in the suppression of local practises, and 
especially local forms of economic production 
and ways of life. With transnational supply chains 
becoming more and more complex, it is imperative 
that transnational impacts are taken into account 
in national raw materials strategies. In addition 
to integrating the issue of sustainability into such 
strategies, which many States already do, States 
should ensure that their raw materials strategies 
take into account human rights obligations and 
the economic conditions before, during and after 
extractive operations.
Enterprises must meet their responsibility to 
respect human rights. Host-country enterprises, 
like Cerrejón and drummond, should therefore 
actively draw on independent, external human 
rights expertise and communicate how this 
expertise flows into their business processes. 
These enterprises should not stop at the level of 
policy commitment in this respect: they should 
change their business activities in ways that are 
demonstrably aimed at improving the situations 
of the affected communities. When analysing the 
risks of adverse human rights impacts, enterprises 
should first identify the risks that arise to people 
and determine which of their rights are at risk, 
without regard to any disadvantages this might 
entail for the enterprise, in the form of recourse 
payments or mitigation costs, for instance. In this 
context, enterprises should strictly adhere to the 
avoid – reduce – restore – remediate hierarchy116 
hierarchy: if it is safe to assume that a business 
activity would have an adverse impact on human 
rights, then the activity should not be pursued. 
Home-country enterprises, such as E.ON, RWE, 
Vattenfall and EnBW, should also participate both 
in the development of a risk concept of this kind 
and of the corresponding due diligence processes, 
and they should use their influence to ensure 
that the processes are carried out. Home-country 
enterprises, too, can and should consult indepen-
dent human rights experts on these issues.
The host States should make effective use of 
their powers of oversight and control over mining 
activities. In particular they should ensure that 
their regional authorities are not biased and that 
monitoring is not restricted to environmental and 
social aspects, but encompasses human rights as 
well. Independent studies (independent of enter-
prises) on the living conditions and needs of local 
communities should be commissioned and be 
triangulated.117 Enterprises should have to comply 
with social and human rights standards in order 
to obtain a licence, just as they are required, for 
instance, to demonstrate compliance with envi-
ronmental standards in the mine closure plans 
they submit. The regional authorities in Colombia 
currently have great difficulty dealing with the 
complaints they receive. This is due in part to the 
115 The processual, material law and practical hurdles that currently exist are described in Wesche, Philipp / Saage-maaß, miriam (2016): 
Holding Companies Liable for Human Rights Abuses Related to Foreign Subsidiaries and Suppliers before German Civil Courts: Lessons 
from Jabir and Others v KiK. In: Human Rights Law Review 16 (2), pp. 370-385; Krajewski, markus / Oehm, Franziska / Saage-maaß, 
miriam (eds.) (forthcoming): Zivil- und Strafrechtliche Haftung von Unternehmen für menschenrechtsverletzungen.
116 The distinction between reduction and mitigation should be understood in the sense that reduction refers to the risks, while mitigation 
refers to the impacts: when adverse impacts cannot be avoided, the least invasive option must be chosen. The emphasis here lies in the 
area of “do no harm”. mitigating, by contrast, should be understood as active measures taken to ensure that unavoidable interventions 
have little adverse impact. [Cf. the danish Institute for Human Rights (2016), p. 21, which speaks of “avoid-reduce-restore-remediate”; see 
also Bleckmann / Koalick / Utlu (2015), p.13]
117 The term “triangulate” is used here in its sociological meaning, referring to an empirical social research strategy. 
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lack of transparency with respect to the areas of 
competence of the many different State bodies 
that accept complaints, which results in com-
plaints being sent back and forth among them. A 
mechanism should be put in place here to guaran-
tee that all complaints are handled promptly and 
transparently, perhaps by requiring the receiving 
body to track the further processing of complaints 
and make the process they undergo transparent 
for the complaining party. In addition, State bodies 
should not confine themselves to reacting to com-
plaints but should take preventive action as well. 
Close cooperation with the NHRI and civil society 
organisations would be beneficial in this respect. 
The Colombian national action plan should incor-
porate measures to strengthen the regional 
structures for prevention measures and establish 
a more effective system for handling complaints in 
the coal sector. 
In drawing up regional development plans, the 
host State should actively draw on the academic 
expertise on post-extractivism and, above all, get 
members of the public involved, giving special 
consideration to existing local practices in this 
context. In addition, the host State should ensure 
transparency in its treatment of the revenues from 
coal mining and reinvest them in the fulfilment of 
economic, social and cultural rights in the mining 
regions. The unlikelihood that other economic sec-
tors will be able to compensate for the revenues 
lost when the mines close lends added urgency to 
the need for such reinvestment. 
National Human Rights Institutions also have an 
increasingly important role to play: They moni-
tor legislation and the implementation of stat-
utes, advise their governments, participate in 
multi-stakeholder processes and formulate recom-
mendations, some of them addressed to business 
enterprises. In most countries they also hear and 
consider complaints from individuals or groups. 
NHRIs could play a key role in closing the respon-
sibility gaps. Their networks allow them access 
to the places where the human rights impacts of 
business activities are experienced, they have the 
potential to engage directly both with the persons 
and communities being affected and with those 
who are causing the effects, and they also enjoy 
high levels of legitimacy and credibility in the eyes 
of other stakeholders. NHRIs often have offices in 
remote provinces, as those of Colombia’s defen-
soría, and thus have a presence in direct proximity 
to the operations that are adversely affecting 
human rights. However there are scant resources 
available to the human rights offices in the mining 
regions for preventive work; these offices mainly 
act in response to complaints. Their experience 
with the topic of business and human rights or 
the UN Guiding Principles also tends to be limited. 
Capacity building and additional resources are 
therefore necessary, e. g. additional personnel 
and training on how to deal with business-related 
human rights problems. Only then would the NHRI 
be in a position to assist the communities, advise 
the enterprises on human rights issues and set 
up a local system to monitor the human rights 
impacts of business activities in the area. 
It is remarkable however how extensive and dense 
the network of NHRIs already is. In the future, the 
network could be reinforced to enable it to tackle 
the job of monitoring business activities and com-
municating information along the supply chain. 
defensoría’s role in Colombia is already changing. 
In La Guajira, for instance, there are already close 
contacts among the departmental human rights 
office, Cerrejón, the communities affected and 
civil society. In the departments, both civil soci-
ety and the local communities themselves see 
defensoría, unlike the State and the enterprises, 
as having a high level of legitimacy and credibility. 
The enterprises also expect defensoría to play a 
mediating role, one it has already begun to fulfil in 
some respects. 
The NHRIs of the various Latin American coun-
tries have formal linkages with one another 
through various association structures, e. g. the 
Ibero-American Ombudsman Federation and the 
Network of National Human Rights Institutions of 
the Americas. They engage in comparatively little 
cooperation with one another though, particularly 
in the area of business and human rights. Up to 
now, Latin American host States of enterprises 
have primarily acted individually in addressing the 
human rights impacts of business activities. This is 
a strength in the sense that the NHRIs in the host 
countries have developed their own expertise on 
local human rights impacts and are therefore able 
to take appropriate action. Local expertise and 
local measures alone are not sufficient to reduce 
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the actual and potential adverse human rights 
impacts however. Latin American human rights 
institutions have expressed several needs relating 
to regional coordination: in cases where an enter-
prise has operations in multiple countries, there 
is a need for the exchange of information about 
options for action among National Human Rights 
Institutions. Since some of the problems encoun-
tered by Latin American countries are similar, joint 
operationalisation of human rights due diligence 
requirements for enterprises is advisable. Joint 
development of methods for structuring stake-
holder dialogues and tracking the implementation 
of recommendations would also be desirable. By 
cooperating at the region level, NRHIs might also 
succeed in inducing supranational organisations 
to engage in more regulation, e. g. in the European 
Union or the African Union. One could also envis-
age the issuance of joint position statements, 
joint consulting and joint lobbying activities within 
regional protection systems.
In conclusion: All of the actors in the home coun-
try and the host country could do more to ensure 
more effective and sustainable protection for 
human rights in the coal mining regions. Achiev-
ing this will require the improvement of informa-
tion flows and possible courses of action in the 
transnational context and that dialogue partners, 
particularly the communities affected and the 
operating enterprises, be brought onto an equal 
footing – and that no one lose sight of the fact that 
the extraction of raw materials will inevitably come 
to an end someday.
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Abbreviations
BCE  Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, 
Energie (union representing workers in 
the mining, chemical and energy indus-
tries)
BHP  Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited
BMWi  Federal ministry for Economic Affairs 
and Energy
BMZ  Federal ministry of Economic Coopera-
tion and development
CFS Committee on World Food Security
CREER  Centro Regional de Empresas y Empren-
dimientos Responsables 
CSR  Corporate social responsibility
DANE  departamento Adminstrativo Nacional 
de Estadística (national statistical au-
thority) 
DIMR deutsches Institut für menschenrechte 
(German Institute for Human Rights)
EITI  Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive
EnBW  Energie Baden-Württemberg AG
ESC  Economic, social and cultural rights
FARC  Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia)
FES  Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
GDP  Gross domestic product
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
ILO  International Labour Organization
KIK  Textilien und Non-Food GmbH
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
NHRI  National Human Rights Institution
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and development
RWE Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitäts-
werk AG
SIMCO  Sistema de Información minero Colombi-
ana (mining information system)
SOMO  Stichting Onderzoek multinationale 
Ondernemingen (Centre for Research on 
multinational Corporations)
STEAG  Steinkohlen-Elektrizität AG
UN  United Nations 
UNDP United Nations development Programme 
UNGP  United Nations Guiding Principles for 
Business and Human Rights 
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Date Meeting
9 march 2016 minutes of the focus group meeting in Bogotá during the multi-stakeholder 
meeting with representatives from the NHRI of Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Guate-
mala, Ecuador, mexico and Colombia and of the La Guajira and Cesar regional 
offices of Colombia’s defensoría
17 may 2016 minutes of the focus group meeting with civil society in Cesar
18 may 2018 minutes of the focus group meeting with communities in Cesar
19 may 2016 minutes of the focus group meeting with civil society in Cesar
20 may 2016 minutes of the focus group meeting with State authorities in Cesar
21 may 2016 minutes of the focus group meeting with communities in La Guajira
22 may 2016 minutes of the meeting with Cerrejón in La Guajira
23 may 2016 minutes of the focus group meeting with State authorities in La Guajira
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